Historical Policy Analysis

The three articles all touch on the idea that the most powerful/elite actors played key roles during the process of finalizing the SEA but I found Moravcsik’s article to be the most compelling; however, some aspects of this article were not well articulated. The article proposes that through intergovernmental institutionalism, the role of supranational institutions in strengthening “existing interstate bargains as the foundation for renewed integration” (56) was dominant in finalizing the SEA. Moreover that European integration stems from the states and their relative power in the EU.

The three principles of intergovernmental institutionalism are as follows: 1). Intergovernmentalism is the expression of state interests at the national level, meaning the interests of the state are influenced at the domestic level not the international level 2). Lowest-common-denominator bargaining is that of the dominant state interests 3). The protection of sovereignty seeks to maintain state sovereignty without much loss to the supranational organization (Marovcsik 25-26).

Moravcsik explains the three nationalistic goals by the dominant states that lead to the overall approval of the SEA. Historically, Germany has profited “directly from economic integration” (29); France moved forward for political reasons as France’s term for EC presidency happened to come around at the time of negotiations; and Britain was in favor of liberalizing the market so long as the budgetary issues were resolved to their liking.

Through Weiner’s policy analysis guide I believe that this theory effectively describes the account of the SEA. As Marovcsik explains, there were three supranational factors that consistently recurred in EC reforms and thus lead to the successful passage of the SEA in 1986: “pressures from EC institutions; lobbying by transnational business interest groups; and the political entrepreneurship of the Commission” (21).

 

Where Moravcsik struggled was in the definition of the problem as to why the SEA was sought. The issue that lead to the passage of the SEA was not explicitly defined as did the other two articles.  According to the findings of Sanholtz & Zysman and Garrett, the catalyst for  reforms was the perceived decline of American economic dominance (particularly in technology) and the rise of Asian economies, specifically Japan. Clearly further research needs to be done to incorporate definitions of catalysts and domestic policy implications on the international level.

 

Policy Analysis

There are a number of different types of policy analysis to potentially use.  In the case of examining the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) and the creation of the Single Market, events that have already happened, analysis entails what Patton refers to as “descriptive” or “ex post” policy analysis (Patton, 19).  There are two key components of descriptive policy analysis, the first being “retrospective analysis” which is the “description and interpretation of past policies.” (Patton, 19)  The second part of descriptive policy analysis is evaluative, which seeks to examine if the “purposes of the policy” were met. (Patton, 19)  Patton further identifies six steps to follow in the basic policy analysis process:

1)    Verify, Define, and Detail the Problem

2)    Establish evaluation criteria

3)    Identify alternative policies

4)    Evaluate alternative policies

5)    Display and select among alternative policies

6)    Monitor policy outcomes

In identifying which article provides the most logically sound account of the SEA, Patton’s framework is useful to provide a framework for evaluation.

In the first article, Moravcsik argues that the European community “reform rested on interstate bargains between Britain, France, and Germany.” (Moravcsik, 21)  He also points out that there were a number of important preconditions to facilitate changes including “the convergence of economic policy prescriptions of the ruling party coalitions” and the “negotiating leverage that France and Germany gained by exploiting the threat of creating a ‘two-track’ Europe and excluding Britain from it.” (Moravscik, 21)

Moravscik argues that intergovernmental institutionalism is the best explanatory theory.  Intergovernmental institutionalism places a certain degree of emphasis on the importance of supranational organizations in cementing existing interstate bargains as the foundation for integration, but also notes that the main source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves. 

Intergovernmental institutionalism is “based on three principles: intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty.” (Moravschik, 25)  Intergovernmentalism refers to the idea that the expression of state political interest is done at the domestic or national level.  Lowest-common-denominator bargaining means that bargaining “tends to converge toward the lowest common denominator large state interests.” (Moravschik, 26.)  Finally, the strict limits on the future transfers of sovereignty refers to states seeking to prevent large losses of sovereignty to a supranational organization.

            Sandholtz and Zysman primarily focus their article on the importance of economic bases of power.  They argue that “a real shift in the distribution of economic power resources” caused changes within the EU.  Generally speaking, the authors portray increases of economic capabilities in Asia as a catalyst for change.  The rise of Asia necessitated that the European states cooperate economically to remain globally relevant.  Furthermore, Sandholtz and Zysman also argue that the “failure of national strategies for economic growth and the transformation of the left in European politics” led to more European-level, market-oriented solutions. (Sandholtz, 108)  Thus, it was a combination of changes inherent to European states as well as international shifts that resulted in the passage of SEA and the Single Market.

            Garret presents a more eclectic argument than Moravcsik and Sandholtz/Zysman, writing that his “study…draws on several approaches developed in other areas, including those based on spatial theories of political competition and those focusing on bargaining games, the effects of incomplete information, and the dynamics of incomplete contracting.” (Garret, 536)  Using these tools, Garret seeks to answer questions surrounding the dynamics of the EU’s internal market, power structures, and institutions.   Garret points out that authors like Sandholtz and Zysman could be mistaken in attributing the passage of SEA to the rise of other powers like Asia and argues that the EU could have written a number of alternative policy prescriptions.  Garret places a greater degree of emphasis on the role of power politics and how stronger states are able to exert their will within the EU.

            In using Patton’s policy analysis tools, I found the arguments of Sandholtz and Zysman to be the most logically sound, although others might disagree with me.  I thought that they clearly outlined and described an issue (shifting balances of economic power) and established how and why the EU decided to act.  The authors did a good job coherently laying out, in methodical and clear manner, their approach and articulating the circumstances that allowed for the passage of SEA.  Garret’s point is well taken in that there were other possible policy options, but in terms of explaining what happened, I thought Sandholtz and Zysman did a nice job.

EU Theory of Integration

In general, theory serves to help a researcher step back and examine trends. It is a way to succinctly record macro-level observations, in this case, regarding European integration. However, in the case of international relations theory, the subject changes so rapidly that many theories are often outdated. Thus, theory is often used as a framework for analysis. In comparing current situations to past theories, conclusions and inferences can be drawn from any observed changes.

With regard to European integration, there have been a multitude of theories presented to explain the creation of the Union, and considering its relatively short history, only major swings in policy could justify so many different approaches. Given its unique origin, the European Union presents a complicated study for any IR scholar. Born out of strongly independent states, integration theory has journeyed from neo-functionalism, where integration was a natural result of functional and political “spill-over” (Wallace et al., 17-18), to constructivism where integration is now a matter of public opinion, closely related to individually held identities (Hooghe & Marks, 118).

A neo-functionalist approach to the current EU crisis would result in greater central authority over national economies. The idea of functional spill-over discussed in the Wallace et al. (17-18) piece would apply in this case. With a common economy, dependent on the support and success of its member’s economies, in the case of a crisis it would be expected that the EU institutions exert significantly more influence over economic affairs of member states, as it has clearly become an issue that is no longer being sufficiently handled at the national level. When looking at the crisis through an intergovernmentalist lens, we would expect national governments to push back against any EU oversight in their economies. Ideally this would eventually result in some form of cooperative economic monitoring program, structured to distribute influence between EU institutions and national governments. Using the more current constructivist approach, the crisis would be highly influenced by subnational opinions. Given that the Union is increasingly interconnected and individual citizens’ economic status are all closely linked, individual and thus national preferences will play a major role in the resolution of these economic problems.

Theorizing European Integration

      Theories seek to provide a useful framework through which we can better gauge and conceptualize where and how the EU is changing. By chronicling the EU's integration through theories, we seek to understand why States behave the way they do.

      Theorizing on European integration has proven to be a slippery and elusive undertaking. One major reason for this is the diversity of the subject matter involved. Every individual EU member has its own rich and long history as an independent State, developing in conjunction with but independently from the other States around it. Another reason is the changes that continue to occur in the political landscape over time. Post-WWII Europe was not the same as Cold War Europe, and Cold War Europe was different still from the Europe of today. This makes it extremely difficult to stay with only one theory of European integration over time. As Europe changes, so too must the policy analysis that seeks to understand it.

      Yet another thing that makes theorizing about European integration so difficult is what it seeks to determine. The benefits of most theoretical models are that they might one day help predict future actions or behaviors. Each of the major theories discussed below has been the predominant theory at some point in time, but due to real-world monkey wrenches thrown into their theoretical framework, several earlier theories have given way to newer theories. The European Union can be described as a "moving target" that "(h)as a habit of throwing up new and unexpected facts which wrong-foot extant theories" (Hooghe, 108). The ever-changing political, social and economic preferences of individual member States and their populations makes it nearly impossible to rely on one theory of European integration indefinitely. Rather it seems to be a process of trial and error, in which theories that are bent too far to explain shifting circumstances may be eventually broken altogether and replaced by newer, more accurate ones.

      Each major theory would seem to have its own prediction for Europe and the integration project. Neo-functionalists would likely argue that the current crisis will result in increased social pressure by populations on governments to strengthen EU economic institutions, in order to prevent this kind of recession from happening again. They would favor the creation of new 'Euro-bonds' and  a permanent European stabilization fund. Under this theory, economic pressure will continue to "spill-over" into other areas of integration (such as social policy) and thus will ultimately result in a stronger, more unified EU than before.

      Alternatively, Intergovernmentalists would take a very different view of the current situation. They would argue that the Empty Chair Crisis was actually the beginning of states openly re-asserting their sovereignty, and this latest financial crisis will result in more of the same. Countries dissatisfied with the inability of the EU to financially prevent weaker countries from defaulting and requiring a bailout will likely continue to push for more nationalistic (and less federalized) economic policies. In the opinion of many Intergovernmentalists, "neo-functionalists (have) underestimated the resilience of the nation state" (Pollack, 19). The EU as a supranational authority will be left weakened as rational State actors seek to protect their own domestic interests internationally.

      Alternatively, Liberal Intergovernmentalism examines national preferences of domestic constituencies and views national governments as the rational actors who negotiate their respective preferences. Under this model, the current crisis would likely spawn different reactions in different States, depending on whether they were helped (as many Eastern European countries and Ireland were) or hurt (as many Western countries were) by EU integration.

      The importance of social demands by constituents of individual states is highlighted by the Constructivism Theory of integration. Under this model, "human agents do not exist independently from their social environments, and its collectively shared system of meanings" (Pollack, 24). Thus, the outcome of the financial crisis is viewed here as resulting in not merely rational-choice State outcomes, but decisions that reflect the cultural, individual preferences of each EU member.

      Ultimately, these integration theories will continue to change over time as a young EU seeks to refine what level of integration is desirable for its member States.

Theorizing EU Integration

          The role and purpose of theory in studying European integration is to gain a better understanding of the functions and role of the European Union. Theory can provide insights into the “telos of European integration” and the workings of the European Union (Wallace et al., Ch.2, 42). According to Wallace et al., theory can greatly increase our understanding “of EU policy-making, of the respective roles and influence of the Commission, Council, Parliament, and Court,” as well as the “increasingly relationship between EU institutions and their national and sub-national interlocutors” (Wallace et al., Ch. 2, 34). Furthermore, theories are good analytical tools that can be used to explain and chart variation in European Union policy-making over time and across issue areas (Wallace et al., Ch. 2, 16).

Though theory can be useful, in regards to European integration, it has also been a difficult, and contested, enterprise. This is largely due to the fact that the European Union is unique compared to other governing systems in the world. The European Union is in many ways unidentifiable, “in that it escapes labels, such as nation, state, empire, region, federation, which form the conventional toolkit of political science” (Hooghe & Marks, 108). Furthermore, Hooghe & Marks note that European integration challenges the political science division between politics among countries and politics within countries (108). In addition to the challenges it creates to standing political science understanding, the institutional change within the European Union moves very quickly (Hooghe & Marks, 108). For example, “over the space of 50 years, the EU has increased two-and-a-half times in population, from 190 million to 493 million” (Hooghe & Marks, 108-109). Thus, the European Union is distinct in regime creation, in its speed and scope (Hooghe & Marks, 109).

Given the current crisis, each major body of theory would predict (or suggest) something different for Europe and the integration project. According to Neo-functionalism, the spillover effect of integration in one policy area (such as monetary policy) would lead to further integration in another related policy area (such as fiscal policy); thus, the current crisis would lead to further integration (Wallace et al., Ch. 2, 18).  According to Intergovernmentalism, Europe and the integration project would take a step back; with focus being placed more on the nation-states than the Community (Wallace et al., 19). This is because, for intergovernmentalism, “national governments control policy outcomes” (Hooghe & Marks, 113). According to Liberal Intergovernmentalism, national governments will bargain more with each other to deal with the crisis, leading to further integration (Wallace et al., 19-20). For New Institutionalism, “EU institutions ‘matter’, shaping both the policy process and policy outcomes in predictable ways,” thus, according to this theory, institutions will continue to shape European integration during the current crisis (Wallace et al., Ch. 2, 23). Lastly, for Constructivism, the social environment plays a key role and will shape the behavior of states and the EU in dealing with the current crisis (Wallace et al., Ch. 2, 24-25).

The implication of the European Union’s actions in response to the crisis so far for the major theories of European integration varies. I think for Neo-functionalists, the European Union’s actions signal further integration with “bailouts” given to member states and the discussion over a permanent “European Stability Mechanism.” I think for Intergovernmentalism, the recent actions by the European Union goes against this theory, as integration and the EU have taken steps to deal with the crisis across many member states. However, I think recent steps demonstrate the applicability of Liberal Intergovernmentalism because of the response of the EU to the needs/preferences of the national governments of its member states. The creation of the European Rescue Fund and discussion over a permanent “European Stability Mechanism” also demonstrate the usefulness of New Institutionalism, as it appears that the EU is utilizing institutions in response to this crisis. Lastly, I think that the current crisis has created a social environment in which the EU has to respond and thus, Constructivism can be used to somewhat better understand EU action.

European Integration Theories

The general role of theory is to attempt to give an explanation for why events occur in the manner that they do. European Integration theories all try to give the audience an account for why policies and institutions behave in a certain manner, make decisions, or progress in a certain way. I think what Pollack said at the end of chapter 2 about scholars theorizing European integration seems accurate not just for the EU but many different theories for other topics as well: “theorizers of European Integration [are] blind men touching an elephant, each one feeling a different part of the elephant purporting to describe a very different animal” (42). It is difficult to agree upon a theory if scholars are analyzing the EU from its many different angles or from the multiple layers that make up the union. European integration is also difficult to generalize because it is constantly evolving as more states enter the union.

Pollack and Hooghe & Marks compare and contrast a few different theories of integration including neo-functionlism, intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, and even constructivism; all having overlapping ideas but essentially trying to predict how integration will take place from different perspectives.

Considering the current crisis it would seem that neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists would rally to place more authority into the institution to solve matters with sectorial cooperation rather than depend upon the individual nation-states. As the EU Observer illustrates, the economic centralization of the EU in response (2013) to the crisis aligns well with intergovernmentalism/neo-functionalism in that more power is seemingly given to the institution.  

Constructivism argues that individual identities are shaped by our social environment in which we consider socially constructed rules and institutions to determine our actions and behaviors towards certain situations (Pollack, p. 24). This theory would suggest that each member state of the EU would resolve the crisis through social institutions which are woven into the makeup of the EU. However, constructivism would be difficult to quantify as it suggests that the EU would be influencing the preferences and behaviors of the member governments and not that individual agents influence the interests of the EU.

Topic #2 - theorizing EU integration

Although it can at times be tiring to constantly examine theories or models that initially appear to have little practical value, they can certainly be useful for their (however rudimentary) explanatory capabilities.  In addition, the process of developing new theories can often effectively alter one’s world view and allow for the examination of an issue from novel perspectives that yield new insights.

 Going off on a somewhat relevant tangent, in my final semester as an undergrad I had to read a book called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn.  I thought the book served to prove the relevance of theory as it discussed the history of scientific discovery through a paradigmatic framework, arguing that progress is made through “revolutions” that allow for the replacement of old models of thought with new ones.  With that said, theorizing European integration has been difficult because the EU “escapes labels, such as nation, state, empire, region, [or] federation” and it “travels at great velocity” (Hooghe and Marks, 108) by quickly changing.

The four most influential theories of European integration are “neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, and constructivism.” (Pollack, 16.)   Although at times similar, each theory follows its own logic.  Neo-functionalists understood the development of the European Union as “developing by a process of ‘spillover’” (Pinder, 7) as governments expand, primarily through institutions, their control of one sector to another.  In the case of the Europe, this was seen in the evolution from the ECSC to the EU.  Neo-functionalists could have difficulty accounting for the economic crisis, but might suggest that it will force states to integrate even further to address the problem. 

On the other hand, adherents of intergovernmentalism argue that neofunctionalists “underestimated the resilience of the nation-state.” (Pollack, 19.)  They argue that nation-states are not becoming obsolete and contend that it is not supranational organizations but rather member state governments that have (and will continue to) determine the direction of the EU.  Liberal intergovernmentalism expands on these points by placing a certain degree of emphasis on institutions by essentially arguing that states form their preferences domestically and will use institutions when it serves their purposes. Intergovernmentalists might predict that the EU will fragment under the pressure of the current economic troubles.

The institutionalism school of thought unsurprisingly focuses on the importance of institutions in European integration.  There are three main types of institutionalism.  The first, rational-choice institutionalism, focuses on how states work for their own self-interests and how they decide to use and are affected by institutions.  Second, sociological institutionalism accounts for the role that norms, rules, and conventions play for states.  Finally, historical institutionalism “focuses on the effects of institutions over time” (Pollack, 22) and how institutions affect those who established them.  Institutionalists might argue that so long as the crucial institutions of the EU remain in place, the crisis will have limited effects.

The fourth broad theory is constructivism.  Constructivists emphasize the role of norms and identities in their understanding of EU integration.  They would likely argue that the EU will not be threatened by the economic crisis as long as member states understand their identities to be tied to the EU.

In terms of the four listed theories, I think that EU actions in response to the crisis have served to both demonstrate the EU’s capability to act but also its potential limitations.  It will be interesting to see if indeed a new theory will be needed to understand the EU.  In addition, I think that the relative strength of some states, particularly Germany, pose interesting questions. Hooghe and Marks argue that “European integration is one outcome of a broader process of authority dispersion,” (Hooghe and Marks, 114).  However, it will be interesting to see if the current crisis lends itself to a more (albeit perhaps informal) hierarchical approach within the EU.