The
passage of the SEA and creation of the Single Market were complex undertakings
that necessarily have created varying theoretical accounts of how and why they
were successful, and what motivated their creation. The three articles assigned
all have accounts that vary depending on which theoretical school they adhered
to in their analysis.
The
first article by Maravcsik states the goal of the SEA to be the removal of
internal frontiers and barriers to trade and the movement of people across
borders, as set forth in the EC 1985 Commission White Paper (Moravcsik, 19). He
focuses extensively and almost exclusively on the motivations and negotiations of the Council members
and European leaders in bargaining over the Act. He concludes that this
negotiation resulted in an SEA that was a "new approach" to old
financial problems and resulted in a streamlined decision making process. He
rejects the view that institutional reforms were the result of any kind of
"elite alliance" between European business interest groups (as put forth in the Sandholz article discussed below) and EC
officials and instead emphasizes that it stemmed from a desire of the Heads of
State to solidify their domestic interests in an intergovernmental
institutionalist framework (Moravcsik, 20). I personally found this article to
be overly focused on the Heads of State actors in the bargaining process
(though I understand that he seems to be trying to move away from the more traditional
analysis of the SEA as stemming soley from bargaining between elites and EC
members). He rejects the notion that the SEA demonstrates a rebirth or
vindication of neofunctionalism and advocates instead an intergovernmental
institutionalistic approach (Moravcisk, 56). This intergovernmental approach does not match with my own analytical framework preference, since it underemphasizes the importance of non-state actors and does not look at the bigger, global picture and market pressures. Although Moravcsik also offers
little analysis on the actual implementation of the SEA he does extensively
cover the domestic government's motivations for selecting its policy stances.
In my opinion, the
second article by Garrett is slightly more logically sound. It notes as well that the SEA's goal was the removal of
non-tarrif barriers to trade. Garrett also covers more extensively than Moravcsik
what are the implications of a new, Single European market, and the streamlined
legislative process stemming from the introduction of qualified majority voting
in the Council of Ministers. (Garrett, 536). I agree with his functionalist
approach to an extent, but I also think that it does not highlight enough the
pressures of constituents on their leaders domestically nor the special
interests lobbied by businesses in support of fewer barriers to trade. He seems
to agree with Moravcsik's view that the ultimate form of the internal market is
dominated by the most powerful countries like Germany and France, a view that I think is accurate (Garrett, 560).
The
third article by Sandholz and Zysman provided the most logically sound
analysis, in my opinion. This article focused more extensively than the
previous two on what the actual implications of the SEA are and the current
issues it faces. They cast the EU market in a more global perspective, along with the
American and Asian markets. They stress that Europeans must show a more
"coherent political presence" on the world stage if they are to compete
in the world economy. (Sandholz, 127). I think this analysis is more practical
and applicable to real world problems that emerge, and I like that it casts the
EU Single Market not in terms of itself alone, but in terms of a larger,
shifting global economy, which undoubtedly has an influence today in the
desired level of eventual EU integration. Contrary to Moravcsik, they emphasize
the role of elites and business lobbyist pressures for less economic barriers
between borders (though they note these groups are unlikely to retain this role
in the future). (Sandholz, 127-8).
My
favorite aspect of the Sandholz and Zysman analysis is that it dismisses the
importance of many competing analytical frameworks seeking to understand the
SEA. They seem to reject adhering to any one particular theoretical framework,
and instead analyze the complex real world pressures on and implications of the
SEA. Studying these various frameworks and how they are continually surpassed by
newer ones seeking to explain some new developmental shift has left me
unconvinced that they are necessarily the most useful tool for understanding EU
integration, its policies, or its implications. As put forth in this article,
"In the end, it is not a matter of which (theoretical analysis) is better,
but of whether the right questions are being asked." (Sandholz, 127).
It's interesting that everyone seemed to have a different perspective on which analysis was the most logically sound. I think your outline of the three different articles are very good and your arguments for why the Sandholz & Zysman's article is the best analysis, makes sense to me. Sandholz & Zysman's article definitely takes on a global perspective and their discussion on the motivations for further European integration, particularly in terms of the economy, as a result of the rise and decline of the Asian and American markets is important in understanding why the SEA was adopted. This global perspective is essential for understanding what could be the motivations for creating an European Single Market. However, I think that Moravcsik's analysis is also important because it focuses on the actors, or "claim-makers," who are attempting to push a certain agenda - in this case towards a single internal market in Europe. These actors are also essential to the policy formation process and understanding the viewpoints of each actor (i.e. France, Germany, and Britain) is extremely useful to knowing how the SEA came about.
ReplyDeleteEmily -- your comment here, along with Ryan's post, highlight one key tension among these articles, namely the fact that they are all explaining slightly different things. There is, of course, a difference between explaining why the SEA came about (why was a common market chosen as the preferred solution as opposed to other options) and explaining the particular form that the common market took (the final version of the SEA) once that overarching policy preference has been chosen from the broader menu of options. From the articles that we have read, where does each fall in terms of what they are actually aiming to explain?
DeleteEveryone does seem to have their own preference, perhaps it depends on our own view of EU integration generally and our favored policy analysis framework? Moravcsik definitely had a strong focus on the big players (France, Germany, Britain, etc.) and though I didn't prefer his analysis overall (mainly because of his lack of discussion on the future implications of the SEA) I definitely agree with his viewpoint that the relative political power of each big player going into negotiations for the SEA played an important role in the outcome.
ReplyDeleteOur own assumptions about the how we think the world works certainly shades our interpretation of these articles. That is exactly why we need the concrete steps described in the readings on policy analysis so that we can move past the way that our own assumptions influence on our analysis!
DeleteIn terms of the specific steps discussed in the policy analysis handout and the Patton & Sawicki article, where are these articles have weak/strong? Answering that question in detail will give us a much more analytical and less impressionistic evaluation of the policy process!
I agree with Emily. Your analysis of all three articles is spot on and well articulated. However, I also agree with Emily that it is important to always consider the role that individual (national) interests play in EU policy making. While, in the case of the Single European Act, it is imperative to be mindful of the global perspective, there is no denying the influence exerted by the three main actors: France, Germany and Britain.
ReplyDeleteI would also like to point out how much I appreciate your point about Sandholz & Zysman's dismissal of any one theoretical framework. This is an issue I've been grappling with all weekend while thinking on these topics. Considering how many different theoretical frameworks exist regarding EU integration, and how quickly the status quo can change, it makes no sense to get wrapped up in one analysis model. Indeed, it seems almost a hindrance.