Theories
seek to provide a useful framework through which we can better gauge and
conceptualize where and how the EU is changing. By chronicling the EU's integration
through theories, we seek to understand why States behave the way they do.
Theorizing on European integration has
proven to be a slippery and elusive undertaking. One major reason for this is
the diversity of the subject matter involved. Every individual EU member has
its own rich and long history as an independent State, developing in conjunction
with but independently from the other States around it. Another reason is the
changes that continue to occur in the political landscape over time. Post-WWII
Europe was not the same as Cold War Europe, and Cold War Europe was different
still from the Europe of today. This makes it extremely difficult to stay with
only one theory of European integration over time. As Europe changes, so too
must the policy analysis that seeks to understand it.
Yet another thing that makes theorizing
about European integration so difficult is what it seeks to determine. The
benefits of most theoretical models are that they might one day help predict
future actions or behaviors. Each of the major theories discussed below has
been the predominant theory at some point in time, but due to real-world monkey
wrenches thrown into their theoretical framework, several earlier theories have
given way to newer theories. The European Union can be described as a
"moving target" that "(h)as a habit of throwing up new and
unexpected facts which wrong-foot extant theories" (Hooghe, 108). The
ever-changing political, social and economic preferences of individual member
States and their populations makes it nearly impossible to rely on one theory
of European integration indefinitely. Rather it seems to be a process of trial
and error, in which theories that are bent too far to explain shifting
circumstances may be eventually broken altogether and replaced by newer, more
accurate ones.
Each major theory would seem to have its
own prediction for Europe and the integration project. Neo-functionalists would
likely argue that the current crisis will result in increased social pressure
by populations on governments to strengthen EU economic institutions, in order
to prevent this kind of recession from happening again. They would favor the
creation of new 'Euro-bonds' and a permanent
European stabilization fund. Under this theory, economic pressure will continue
to "spill-over" into other areas of integration (such as social
policy) and thus will ultimately result in a stronger, more unified EU than
before.
Alternatively, Intergovernmentalists would
take a very different view of the current situation. They would argue that the
Empty Chair Crisis was actually the beginning of states openly re-asserting
their sovereignty, and this latest financial crisis will result in more of the
same. Countries dissatisfied with the inability of the EU to financially
prevent weaker countries from defaulting and requiring a bailout will likely
continue to push for more nationalistic (and less federalized) economic
policies. In the opinion of many Intergovernmentalists,
"neo-functionalists (have) underestimated the resilience of the nation
state" (Pollack, 19). The EU as a supranational authority will be left
weakened as rational State actors seek to protect their own domestic interests
internationally.
Alternatively, Liberal
Intergovernmentalism examines national preferences of domestic constituencies
and views national governments as the rational actors who negotiate their
respective preferences. Under this model, the current crisis would likely spawn
different reactions in different States, depending on whether they were helped
(as many Eastern European countries and Ireland were) or hurt (as many Western
countries were) by EU integration.
The importance of social demands by
constituents of individual states is highlighted by the Constructivism Theory
of integration. Under this model, "human agents do not exist independently
from their social environments, and its collectively shared system of
meanings" (Pollack, 24). Thus, the outcome of the financial crisis is
viewed here as resulting in not merely rational-choice State outcomes, but
decisions that reflect the cultural, individual preferences of each EU member.
Ultimately, these integration theories
will continue to change over time as a young EU seeks to refine what level of
integration is desirable for its member States.
A good summary of the main tenets of each body of theory, Ryan. Given your observations and knowledge of the EU response to the crisis so far, which body of theory (or bodies of theory) find the most support in the empirical evidence that we have concerning the European response?
ReplyDeleteIn your analysis of a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, you mention that reactions to the crisis would be different among member states depending on how they were affected by the economic downturn. I find this very interesting, and although I know that Germany has been one of the more vocal opinions on how the crisis should be handled, I wonder if we will see this divide grow between countries that were helped vs. countries that were hurt, as you put it.
ReplyDeleteProf. Boesenecker asked a question of me, in response to my blog post, regarding shared ideas or norms across European societies, and I feel that given the current crisis, these shared ideas may not yet reach across Europe but instead across these two separate groups that Ryan has illustrated.
Thank you Professor Boesenecker. I would say that neo-functionalism seems to find the most support at the moment in the empirical evidence of the European response to the crisis. While the argument could be made from an intergovernmentalist perspective that States are only looking out for their own best interests in passing these measures, it seems to me that the EU is looking to strengthen its economy through increased integration and through maintaining a stronger role in State's domestic economies. Though it is difficult to know for sure since the recession is still going on, I think these measures will result in the spill-over effect argued by neo-functionalists into other areas of integration.
ReplyDeleteCassandra, I definitely think Germany will have a strong hand in shaping policy economically (and perhaps as a result of this leverage, in other areas as well) as a result of the current crisis. It seems willing to bail-out and supply finds where absolutely necessary, but it is difficult to believe that it won't look for some kind of financial return on its expenditure, whether directly through interest rates and long-term repayments or indirectly through an even stronger role in the EU.
Ultimately we would want to conduct a historical policy analysis, once we know the shape of whatever new measures that are put into place, in order to know who exactly the main *actors* (national governments, as intergovernmentalism would suggest? Supranational actors, as neofunctionalism would suggest?) involved in the processes, as well as what the specific process of policy design and implementation was. Remember -- each body of theory directs our attention to different actors as well as different types of process.
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